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PUTTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE - RIGHTS
DISCOURSES, CREATIVE LABOR AND THE EVERYDAY, by Laura
Murray, S. Tina Piper and Kirsty Robertson. Oxford University Press, 2014.
224 pp. Hardback $95.00
Reviewed by Luke McDonagh, Cardiff University Law School.
McDonaghL@cf.ac.uk
The recently published interdisciplinary volume PUTTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE is authored and curated by three well regarded
academics working at Canadian universities in the fields of Intellectual Property
Law (Tina Piper), English and Cultural Studies (Laura Murray) and Visual Art
(Kimberly Robertson). The book is a genuine attempt to engage with the legal,
social, and anthropological logic of intellectual property law, and as such it is
constitutive of what Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder have recently called
the “cultural turn” in intellectual property discourse - the opening up of IP law to
insights from outside the traditional legal and economic arenas. 1 Recent works by
Pottage and Sherman, 2 Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg, 3 and Biagoli,
Woodmansee, and Jaszi 4 are also part of this emerging trend.
Key debates the book engages with are the critiques of intellectual property law
from the subaltern and from indigenous communities. Taking these perspectives
on board, the authors go so far as to refer to themselves as “settler scholars” who
are genuinely trying to piece together the varying critiques of IP into a coherent
whole, with the aim of finding areas of common ground between indigenous
critiques of IP and the recent “free culture” movement that has thrived in the
West, including the highly successful Free and Open Source Software (FOSS)
community (pp. 1-3). Central to the authors' framing of the subject of IP –
“putting it in its place” so to speak - is the idea that there is no one correct model
of regulating creativity that can, or should, be imposed in every circumstance. In
fact, over the course of the book the authors show that innovative practices within
communities tend to be contingent on time and place, and thus, they deserve to be
investigated from this perspective. As the authors say, “our starting point is that
local practices or norms are foundational and persistent, not ancestral or
supplemental” (p. 6). Meanwhile, their understanding of “place” refers to the
“matrix of relations, enforcement regimes and (mis)information campaigns” that
exists within various creative contexts (p. 64).
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In Chapter 2, the authors critically discuss the “free culture” movement, noting in
particular that it often fails to take account of the plethora of lived experiences
that govern every day creativity in many of their surveyed environments. In fact,
the authors are left somewhat cold by the free culture movement as a whole, even
while recognising the movement's successes and undoubted virtues (p. 17):
One of its strengths is its ability, through emphasis on freedom of
expression, to resonate with political positions on both the left and
the right. However, it is ultimately limited and limiting in its
ability to articulate compelling opposition to neoliberal ideologies
and models of cultural life. Individualist in its bones, it is weak in
its capacity for theorizing power, ideology or complex collective
action and experience.
Turning away from “free culture”, the authors then proceed to investigate a
number of creative contexts, including those in the online knitting community
(Chapter 3), plant hormone researchers (Chapter 4), journalists (Chapter 5),
lawyers and judges (Chapter 6), potters (Chapter 7) and art copyists (Chapter 8).
In different ways, all of these investigations shed new light on the way that people
individually and collectively engage in creativity, as well as illuminating their
motivations for doing so. The authors argue that in all of these creative contexts
the property incentives provided by IP are not the primary motivating factors instead, community needs, professional relationships, and personal desires all play
a major role in stimulating acts of creativity.
With respect to journalism in Chapter 5, Laura Murray's focus is on the
“exchange practices” of 19th Century newspaper editors in the USA (p. 86).
While giving a splendid account of the growth of the daily newspaper as a popular
work to be read, Murray also draws out the importance of co-operation and
borrowing from a range of different sources, noting that a high level of cooperation occurred even as newspapers began to compete with one another. In
fact, she argues that the practices of co-operation are precisely what enabled
competition within the burgeoning newspaper market in the United States. As she
relates, during the 19th century a newspaper's quality largely depended upon the
capacity of its editor to maintain close and respectful “exchange relations” with
other newspapers (p. 88). In other words, editors recognised the need to cooperate with one another to obtain news stories so that they could successfully
compete within the market. Murray goes on to describe the tensions that occurred
between different editors when the accepted practices of borrowing and exchange
were violated. For instance, a crucial distinction emerged between “cutting”
(borrowing on the newspaper exchange in accordance with the norms of
attribution) and “cabbaging” (a kind of plagiarism). In the absence of direct legal
norms to fall back on, these “unethical” practices eventually moved editors to
keep “hot” news items away from the exchange for as long as possible (p. 99103).
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Chapter 6 is one of the most intriguing chapters in the book, providing an
exploration of the practices of copying and reproduction in the context of the legal
profession in Canada. Piper's is the first authoritative account I have read on the
subject and it is certainly worthwhile. For one thing, the question of how to deal
with the copyrights that judges hold over their judicial decisions and documents is
a highly important one since it impacts on the availability (or non-availability) of
judgments for legal scholars not just in North America, but also in the UK,
Germany, and many other jurisdictions. Moreover, as Piper explores, judges are
typically seen as the “authors” of their decisions even though the judgments “may
include substantial, often unacknowledged, contributions” from clerks and
lawyers involved in the case (p. 112). Piper concludes the chapter by taking
account of two interesting, and perhaps even contradictory, perspectives that
emerge from her examination. The first of these centres on the fact that while
those in the legal profession work to interpret and uphold the law, in practice
judges and lawyers often “copy liberally from others, often without attribution”
(p. 127). In this respect, she notes that “formal law has little purchase on lawyers'
own information norms and practices” (pp. 127). The second point Piper
identifies is that the way lawyers “manage their special professional knowledge
has shaped contemporary copyright law in Canada” (pp. 127). In this regard,
Piper argues that the judiciary in Canada tends to apply a “lawyers' view” of
copyright in the research context, with activities that serve the public interest seen
as particularly valid and worthy of protection.
Although the main focus of the book is on “North American spaces” several of
the book's most valuable insights arise from the authors' investigations into the
actions of creative communities outside of the West. Most prominently, in the
penultimate chapter Kimberly Robertson examines the “Art of the Copy” in
Dafen Village, Shenzen province, China (p. 158). This is the (in)famous site in
China where many (often superb) copies of objects and paintings of Western fine
art are mass produced in assembly-line fashion, then shipped to customers all over
the world. Robertson's analysis illuminates the real labor and skill involved in the
creation of these high quality copies, which emerge out of a community where
skilled craftsmanship is valued more highly than originality, and notions of
“authenticity” in art have little resonance. In this context, IP law plays little role.
Indeed, Robertson's analysis demonstrates that copyright has little regard for such
copies, given the emphasis within copyright discourse on valuing originality qua
intellectual creativity, as opposed to the quality of the “mere” craft and labor
involved (p. 168-169).
In the concluding chapter - Chapter 8 - the authors state that while exploring the
various contexts “we often could not find anything recognisable as an alternative
to IP - incentives and regulation occurred through interpersonal relationships,
institutional or governmental structure, or other modes that had nothing to do with
rules for ownership or use” (p. 183). Rather than a coherent theme, what emerged
was a sense of “disintegration” with respect to the normal rules of IP (p. 183). At
the publication stage, the authors even found attributing their own chapters to
each other “as author” problematic given the fact that their research projects had
The IP Law Book Review

13

ended up being highly collaborative. Nonetheless, they did manage this in the
end, falling back on the authorial model, albeit with caveats.
In fact, it is the attempt to highlight the “disintegrated” state of IP concepts within
certain creative contexts that represents the ultimate value of the book: the authors
do not end up simply abandoning IP law and recommending the imposition in its
place of an overarching alternative model of protection - such as “traditional
knowledge”, a concept that scholars have struggled to produce a core accepted
definition for, or even a resolute raison d'être for, in recent years. Indeed, it is to
the author’s credit that they refrain from making overbroad of simplified
recommendations, and instead ask the reader to reflect upon what they have
written, and to seek to apply their insights in questioning IP’s place in law and in
society.
ENDNOTES
1

A. Chander and M. Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 Texas L. Rev. 1397.
A. Pottage and B. Sherman, FIGURES OF INVENTION: A HISTORY OF MODERN
PATENT LAW (Oxford University Press, 2010).
3
B. M. Frischmann, M. J. Madison, and K. J. Strandburg (Eds.), GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Oxford University Press, 2014).
4
M. Biagoli, M. Woodmansee and P. Jaszi (Eds.), MAKING AND UNMAKING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (University of Chicago Press, 2011).
2

Suggested Citation: 5 The IP Law Book Review 11(2015)
© 2015 Luke McDonagh
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THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS OF
CULTURAL CREATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD, by Debora J.
Halbert. Routledge, 2014. 267 pp. Hardback $155.00
Reviewed by Sara Bannerman
Department of Communication Studies and Multimedia, McMaster University.
banners@mcmaster.ca
In THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS OF
CULTURAL CREATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD, Debora Halbert
examines the transformation of the (mainly American) state and its relationship to
copyright and the culture industries. 1 She tracks a number of trends: the
transformation of intellectual property piracy into a national security threat; the
increasing, and increasingly problematic, role of the state in policing national
culture in an age of globalization; and challenges to the dominance of the culture
industries in social life, economic relations, and foreign affairs. Grounded in
critical political economy, Halbert’s argument also draws on critical and
postmodern theory to critique the role of the state in an increasingly commodified
and increasingly globalized culture.
Halbert argues that the shape and role of the American state in creating and
enforcing copyright law has transformed dramatically since the 1990s. These
transformations take a number of forms. First, in Chapter 2, Halbert describes the
reconfiguration of the US government bureaucracy to prioritize intellectual
property enforcement—a reconfiguration that serves a rising class of intellectual
property owners by producing a managed population of consumers for the
information age (p. 28). From the establishment of the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property heading the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO)(p. 33), to the establishment of intellectual property
subdivisions within government departments ranging from the Library of
Congress to the State Department and the White House, to the creation of the
intellectual property tsar and the establishment of an intellectual property
committee at cabinet level (pp. 34-36), the bureaucratic transformation of the
American state is far-ranging. With revolving doors between government and
industry (p. 44), the newly-configured state stands ready to shore up concentration
of ownership in IP-related industries, whether American or foreign-owned (pp.
48-49).
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In Chapter 3 Halbert outlines a second transformation: the reconfiguration of the
American foreign policy agenda and the framing of intellectual property piracy as
a new national security threat. The construction of this discourse frames foreign
states and intellectual property infringers as enemies, criminals, and terrorists who
engage in cyberattacks and support terrorism. Such framing paves the road to
increasing surveillance and to new forms of warfare (pp. 68 and 75). While some
states, such as the UK, have resisted this IP-maximalist approach to some degree,
many others have adopted it (pp. 78-79), making for possible fractures in the
global community between IP-maximalists and opponents of the maximalist
agenda (p. 80).
In Chapter 4 Halbert outlines a third transformation: the growing efforts of the
American state to achieve legitimacy as the protector and promoter of American
culture. Simultaneously, Halbert tracks the shift since the Cold War from state
funding to market forces as the mechanism for cultural and economic promotion.
Prior to the turn to copyright as a driver of information exchange (p. 88), the
American state promoted American culture abroad and emphasized state funding
of the arts, both as weapons in the Cold War. The end of the Cold War meant a
drastic reduction in funding and an increasing reliance on market forces in the arts
(p. 96). The American state, in adopting the neoliberal model of globalization,
cultural export, and intellectual property, Halbert argues, has attempted to
maintain a form of economic and cultural hegemony while simultaneously
undermining the territorial boundaries of the nation state itself (p. 111).
In Chapters 5 and 6 Halbert troubles the connection between the nation state and
culture. Drawing, in Chapter 5, on the example of the FIFA 2010 World Cup
theme song Waka Waka—This Time for Africa, Halbert points to the
fundamental hybridity of culture, and its tendencies to flow outside of national
boundaries. The Waka Waka theme song, performed by Columbian pop star
Shakira in an event based very much around “the national container”, was adapted
from a song by the Cameroonian band Golden Sounds, who had adapted it from
historical military marches. The words to the song, as well as the music and style,
had circulated internationally for decades (pp. 118-119).
Noting these
international flows and the hypocrisy of cultural conglomerates in often failing to
acknowledge their indebtedness to them, Halbert troubles the notion that the
global South is one of the greatest sources of piracy. She draws on three case
studies of Pablo Picasso’s “African” period, the Red Bull energy drink (which is
the version of a Thai drink as marketed outside Thailand), and fan fiction to show
that Western culture appropriates local and peripheral cultures in ways that cause
that appropriation to be hidden and unacknowledged: “The West, especially the
United States, tends not to acknowledge its cultural debts, even while demanding
that the rest of the world pay it for its originality and commercial cultural
products” (p. 137). While the appropriation and sharing of culture happens in
many directions, the state, as well as international institutions, insert themselves
into cultural flows, “reterritorializing” them, and establishing “rules of the game”
that favor corporate entities (p. 136).
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In Chapter 6, Halbert brings her discussion of cultural appropriation to bear on
indigenous knowledge in particular. Too often, researchers and cultural producers
have taken the knowledge and culture of indigenous peoples as “raw material” for
knowledge and cultural production of the West (p. 149). Against this
appropriation, Halbert notes that indigenous peoples have, in efforts to establish
autonomy, made efforts to bypass the nation state, turning directly to systems of
international governance to forge international community and to gain visibility.
Indigenous peoples’ struggles at local, national, and international levels to disrupt
traditional ideas about intellectual property offer “a catalyst for others who are
also interested in a future for creativity that is more flexible than that advocated
by the culture industry” (p. 144)—one that takes place outside of capitalist
production. Rather than offering a policy prescription, Halbert outlines three
possible paths forward: strategies to close and protect indigenous knowledge and
culture, efforts to embrace market forces, and the construction of a new global
indigeneity that ignores elusive “authentic” indigenous culture to construct a new
sense of indigenous identity.
In Chapter 7 Halbert outlines a manifesto, or a set of policy proposals, regarding
user generated content. She describes the history of the term “user-generated
content” and the myths that the concept disrupts: the myth that creators create to
make money, that culture is produced by professionals, and the myth of the
romantic and original artist (p. 183). Halbert lauds the “disintermediated, and
thus more authentic, political experience” that YouTube offers (p. 189) and the
social and political value of user generated content (p. 188). She proposes that
copyright law be loosened to allow “maximum creation of derivative works” (p.
197), the exemption of liability for platforms on which non-commercial derivative
works are published (p. 197), penalties for overly aggressive notice and takedown
procedures (p. 198), the preservation and protection of user generated content (p.
198), a shorter term of copyright with a renewal period (p. 198), and the
expansion of the fair use provisions of American copyright law (p. 199).
Deeply interested in the idea of a non-commodified cultural future, Halbert, in her
concluding chapter, draws richly on the Frankfurt School to condemn the culture
industry (p. 221) as a form of prison that, mounted on digital wheels, becomes “a
surveillance system built into the concept of the state itself” (p. 224). While
revolutions, as the Frankfurt School scholars also noted, have failed, resistance is
“as much about building something new as it is tearing down the old” (p. 225).
User generated content is one remedy. Halbert therefore advocates “selfexpression outside the framework of modern consumer culture” to create “a good
life—a do it yourself (DIY) life” (p. 225).
While at times, such as in her discussion of indigenous knowledge, Halbert
appropriately avoids policy prescriptions, this reader still feels that a broader
manifesto or set of policy proposals, beyond the topic of user generated content,
might help to address some of the other problems outlined so well in her book.
How might the growth of the American intellectual property bureaucracy be
transformed or curtailed? How might the American foreign policy agenda, which
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frames piracy as a national security threat, be redrawn? What is the appropriate
role of the state in promoting national culture?
It would be interesting, also, if Halbert were to expand her discussion of the
transformation of the “state of copyright” to encompass the important
transformations made not only to the American IP bureaucracy but also the
similar transformations of other states, including other major power, middle
powers, and countries of the South. The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), sometimes working in conjunction with transnational rights holder
groups, has undertaken massive projects and studies to transform the IP
institutions of countries of the South, some under the rubric of its “development
agenda”. These transformations seem as integral to the “state of copyright” as
does the transformation of the American state that Halbert describes.
One of the tremendous strengths of Halbert’s work is her rich drawing upon the
literatures of political science, law, cultural theory, and critical theory. As a
result, her work speaks to readers in the field of law, but also to readers in
political science, political economy, anthropology, cultural studies, and
communication studies. THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT provides great insight
into some of the most important questions of our time in the field of culture and
creativity.

ENDNOTES
1

THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT follows Halbert’s two previous books,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE POLITICS
OF EXPANDING PROPERTY RIGHTS (Quorum, 1999) and RESISTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Routledge, 2005); as well as her co-edited
COPY/SOUTH DOSSIER (2006); and her co-EDITED SAGE HANDBOOK ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Sage, 2013).
Suggested Citation: 5 The IP Law Book Review 15 (2015)
© 2015 Sara Bannerman
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Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2015) pp. 19-25
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR
KNOWLEDGE, by Peter Drahos. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 262 pp.
Hardback $99.00
Reviewed by Ruth L. Okediji, University of Minnesota Law School
rokediji@umn.edu
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR
KNOWLEDGE provides a critical account of the relationship between intellectual
property (IP) and “the non-developmental state” (p. 1). Professor Peter Drahos
argues that indigenous peoples’ knowledge has been systematically enclosed
through pervasive and displacing strategies that have simultaneously excluded
indigenous peoples from exploiting their own knowledge, while providing tools to
allow others to appropriate that same knowledge. The book’s fundamental
thesis—anchored in a deep skepticism about the role of IP as an instrument of
economic development—is that indigenous people can adapt to, and benefit from,
the utilization of their knowledge in Western-style economic markets with simple
changes to existing intellectual property regimes associated with the leading
developed countries.
The book starts with a compelling frame: the relatively high scores that
economically successful states obtain in rankings about innovation, human
welfare, political integrity, and economic progress stand in sharp contrast to the
conditions of life that indigenous groups in these countries face on a regular basis.
What defines this gap, how national and international regimes manage and
perpetuate it, and what types of policy tools may facilitate a greater capacity for
indigenous people to control and benefit from their own knowledge drives the
books’ central purpose. 1 Based on detailed case studies in Australia, Professor
Drahos analyzes challenges faced by Aboriginal groups who want to use their
customary knowledge assets in formal market sectors (pp. 108-127). The case
studies are not solely about indigenous knowledge rendered in the form of IP
notions of creativity and innovation. Rather, in Chapters 2 and 3 Professor Drahos
introduces a thorough and integrated value system that encompasses land,
intellect, social order, and political structures among indigenous people. He
describes how membership in kinship systems encompass a range and variety of
property interests, including instantiations of intangible property that could “fit”
under certain intellectual property categories such as trademarks or copyrights.
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These early chapters proceed from an internal examination of how indigenous
peoples view and understand their world, including the systematic risks posed by
the imposition of foreign (and often hostile) legal cultures on their way of life.
Professor Drahos tells their story, using their words and their worldview of the
past, present, and future.
In sharing detailed insights about the power of land ownership and “cosmological
connectionism,” (pp. 69-94) Professor Drahos, in Chapter 4, makes a compelling
case for the economic value derived from indigenous peoples’ knowledge and
why the official recognition of the value of this knowledge has historically had
even greater adverse effects on Aboriginal communities. He demonstrates how,
with the development of an international treaty complex recognizing the value of
traditional knowledge, 2 states have conferred symbolic value on indigenous
knowledge but did not fundamentally alter the extractive systems that devalued
and misappropriated it. He argues that “rule ritualism”—representing a change in
the law rather than “some deeper attitudinal and behavioral change” (p. 72)
towards indigenous knowledge—has “given mythical assurances while denying
tangible benefits” to indigenous peoples (p. 72). This Chapter illustrates a pattern
also pervasive in intellectual property relations, a pattern in which treaties and
text produce governance rules that appeal to economic development as the core
objective behind the grant of proprietary rights, but in the end set very few
meaningful standards that actually deliver development outcomes for indigenous
people (or developing countries). Professor Drahos’ analysis offers cautionary
lessons about the dangers associated with the recognition of indigenous
knowledge, using these Aboriginal experiences in Australia as vivid examples of
the costs of a relentless rise of administrative rules to govern knowledge networks
on a global scale.
Since the twentieth century, the international community has engaged in everincreasing levels of symbolic assurance of indigenous people and their
knowledge. Professor Drahos in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, offers a sustained analysis
of the various ways such assurance has harmed indigenous people and placed
ancestral systems of knowledge governance under immense strain (pp. 94-154).
He gives examples of government projects, policies, and bureaucratic structures in
Australia that ultimately legitimized the subordination of indigenous knowledge
systems to formal state control, or otherwise structured economic interests in
ways that destabilized the social networks and values central to indigenous
populations (pp. 108-127). These chapters also reveal the outline of a regulatory
approach that Professor Drahos hopes may accommodate the integrity of
indigenous peoples’ interests in the control and use of their productive assets,
while facilitating opportunities to participate successfully in economic markets
governed by intellectual property and other legal orders. His potential solutions
are not to disengage or remain in conflict with the IP regime; instead, he
emphasizes the importance of simplicity in the rules that are extended to
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indigenous knowledge and the establishment of institutions (e.g., national
commissions such as the one recommended by the Waitangi Tribunal in New
Zealand) to help forge and administer common understandings of indigenous
intellectual property (pp. 194-208).
Professor Drahos’ arguments point to the system of intellectual property—the
rights it confers, the actors involved in it, and the system’s rules and values—as a
key facilitator of the twin forces of exclusion and enclosure of indigenous
peoples’ knowledge.
He illustrates how the methodical de-valuation of
indigenous knowledge provided opportunities to extract that knowledge,
leveraging doctrines such as “novelty,” “originality,” “duration,” or the “public
domain” as barriers to a participatory discourse about indigenous knowledge as
appropriate subject matter for protection under the intellectual property regime or
other legal normative orders (pp. 6-11). This knowledge could materialize not
only as a quantifiable input in formal scientific endeavors, thereby resulting in
significant commercial outcomes for the traditional actors and recipients of
intellectual property’s solicitude, but also as a key component in aiding
contemporary scientific research in tackling various global challenges of our time
such as climate change and other symptoms of ecosystem crises.
There are a number of important themes in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE, at least three of which
should be highlighted. First, intellectual property regimes facilitate the nondevelopmental state and, yet, they are deeply entrenched in the narrative of
economic and political successes that have long-been associated with developed
countries. Second, there are few sui generis regimes that have effectively
overcome the extractive tendencies of the intellectual property system.
Intellectual property rights play an important role in the means and processes by
which indigenous groups are methodically carved out of the economically
successful state. This point is well noted in the “IP and development” literature. 3
Professor Drahos advances the critique by showing how the presumed legitimacy
of intellectual property regimes makes the adverse consequences on the welfare
interests and rights of indigenous groups okay, and thus numbs the moral critique
that even so-called benign justifications for intellectual property deserve. The
power of such symbolic virtue for IP makes it extremely difficult to disgorge the
profits or challenge the behavior of economic agents responsible for transforming
indigenous peoples' knowledge assets into commercial products for the state.
Third, indigenous knowledge and the scientific enterprise may benefit from
changes to the intellectual property system, particularly when research is derived
from partnerships that allow formal science to engage meaningfully with the
methods and practices of indigenous custodians of ancestral knowledge systems.
The consequences of super-imposing intellectual property rules on these native
systems are not trivial, whether to the indigenous groups or to the modern state.
The stunningly low rates of education, high poverty, maternal death, and other
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welfare indicators among indigenous groups living in developed countries are
partly a reflection of these consequences. And despite the creative ways
indigenous peoples have responded to “the state’s extractive order,” (p. i) both in
regard to intellectual property rights and other legal regimes, Professor Drahos’
arguments make clear that the existential risks for indigenous groups remain.
Professor Drahos does not entirely eschew the possibility that intellectual property
regimes can be useful for the protection of indigenous peoples’ knowledge, and
he recommends simple rules for a regulatory system that meaningfully engages
with indigenous knowledge systems. Such rules include a veto power for
indigenous peoples over negotiations that affect their property interests, the
recognition of duty-based notions of stewardship, trusteeship, and guardianship,
and a disclosure requirement in intellectual property applications that reveals
when indigenous knowledge has been utilized (pp. 94-108).
Professor Drahos prefers these changes to sui generis or otherwise “autonomous”
legal regimes to protect indigenous knowledge. He argues that such regimes
exacerbate and extend the extractive consequences of intellectual property rights
(pp. 94-108). Citing India’s traditional knowledge digital library as an example,
he notes that occasional victories for the knowledge assets of indigenous people
are short-lived because these are merely “rule adjustments” that do not undo the
propertization impulse of the state (pp. 154-175). At the same time, such rule
adjustments fail to advance development among indigenous groups and provide a
gloss of legitimacy that hides the structural causes of the non-developmental state
of indigenous groups. In this view, creating policy space for indigenous
knowledge within contemporary intellectual property regimes may facilitate
indigenous economic activity by allowing markets to capture the value of
activities within the customary economy. Copyright and trademark rules in
particular have already engaged many customary practices, creating branding
opportunities and niche markets for “authentic” indigenous stories, arts, crafts,
and foods (pp. 175-202).
I am not as sanguine as Professor Drahos about the constructive prospects of
accommodation for indigenous people’s knowledge within the intellectual
property system for at least two reasons. First, the intellectual property system
itself has come under serious criticism for failing to promote the quality and scope
of innovation for which it was originally designed. Placing indigenous
knowledge within this deeply flawed knowledge management system may serve
only to entrench the longstanding distrust and devaluation of indigenous
knowledge by most developed countries. The risks of gilding the historically
dismissive view of indigenous knowledge with the deep discontent shared among
many citizens, policymakers, and firms about the modern IP system are too great
to be ignored. Second, as Professor Drahos himself observes, changes in the rules
and institutions of the intellectual property game will not be enough to forestall
extractive effects on indigenous peoples; meaningful efforts to recognize
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indigenous people’s knowledge — both in its scientific and economic dimensions
— requires partnerships between scientists and indigenous peoples. By sharing
and observing certain aspects of indigenous knowledge systems, the methodology
of formal or “normal” science can be more systematically challenged,
assumptions tested and, if necessary, discarded, and new findings gained more
quickly (pp. 202-221). For example, in Chapter 2, Professor Drahos describes
how the Aboriginal use of fire systems to manage the landscape was thought to be
destructive by early colonizers (pp. 31-56). It was more than three decades later
before “scientific” study revealed the beneficial effects of such fire systems.
Similarly, indigenous knowledge has helped scientists better understand the links
between groundwater hydrology and sustainability of wetlands. Indigenous
cosmology can help identify plants for specific therapeutic use, aid in
understanding the relationship between a combination of plant compounds, and so
on (pp. 31-56).
Examples of the contributions of indigenous knowledge to scientific endeavor are
numerous; numerous enough to have galvanized a multilateral effort at the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to create a sui generis regime to
protect against the misappropriation of Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge, and Traditional Cultural Expressions. 4 Professor Drahos gives
surprisingly brief treatment to this fifteen-year effort, which now incorporates
elements of the proposals he outlines in the latter half of the book. In part, as
noted earlier, Professor Drahos does not consider this effort as ideal for the
multidimensional value sets embedded in indigenous knowledge systems. But it is
important to acknowledge, too, that indigenous peoples are not the only groups
with traditional knowledge; local communities have knowledge assets and, in
many cases, different needs that also deserve recognition. The complexity of
indigenous people’s knowledge, the inextricability of their living from their
knowing, and the legacy of highly evolved social, religious, and political ordering
cannot be easily captured in a single regime. I agree with Professor Drahos that
trying to do so places indigenous institutions, rules, and processes that are so
deeply embedded into the cultural fabric of the people at great risk, in part
because such a regime necessarily implicates the state apparatus. But many
indigenous peoples and local communities have expressed a desire for a
multinational regime, and those expressed desires cannot be discounted for fear
the process may add a disabling complexity.
While states certainly can (and undoubtedly will) try to limit the potential efficacy
of new legal instruments to protect indigenous knowledge, the fact of the
normative recognition of indigenous peoples’ knowledge, and the formal
acknowledgement of alternative knowledge systems, is a positive step in the
international legal system. At a minimum, it sets up a counter-regime to the
global intellectual property system, in which countries who wish to can
implement meaningful instruments of control and place them in the hands of
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indigenous peoples to facilitate their control over their productive assets. The
genetic resource disclosure of origin requirement, which is now part of the patent
law in a number of developed and developing countries, 5 illustrates that changes
to the structure of the intellectual property system are not implausible, and that
firms who wish to engage in international trade will be subject to disclosure
obligations even when countries such as the U.S. or Canada decline to join the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the recently ratified Nagoya Protocol. In
other words, the dense transnationalism of the intellectual property system makes
it impossible for even the most powerful countries to avoid the consequences of
normative change occasioned outside the international intellectual property
regime, but that are implemented within its gates.
Indigenous peoples’ knowledge is not valuable simply because of what it tells us
about the past; it is not a historical relic or a romantic tradition. Professor Drahos
demonstrates that indigenous knowledge is a living institution with deeply
complex values embedded in well-grounded institutional forms and with dense
rules governing its interaction with the state. The case studies show an
indestructible link between the past, present, and future in the generation, use, and
adaptation of knowledge for on-going productive purposes in indigenous
communities. Any effort to “make room at the table” for indigenous people’s
knowledge, and to do so on functionally equivalent grounds, will require
adjustments to the rules of the intellectual property system, to its processes and its
core assumptions about what constitutes valuable knowledge, how such value is
determined and who determines it. In his book, Professor Drahos notes early on
that the effects of extractive property regimes go beyond economic loss, physical
degradation of territories, or marginalization from the welfare ambit of the state’s
political obligation to facilitate development of all people. Rather, the battle for
the protection of indigenous people’s knowledge is “also a fight to preserve or
rebuild ancestral systems of decision-making” (p. 10) or in other words, to
maintain the right and the space to live who they are as indigenous groups. I
should hasten to add that although this may echo strains of a right to selfdetermination, which is certainly part of the narrative of indigenous peoples under
international law, 6 the fight for indigenous knowledge is more than that. It is,
most fundamentally, a right for equality — the civil and political equality that
enables indigenous groups to choose their own values and to hold firm to their
self-association as a group.
While Professor Drahos’ caution about the dangers of a new legal regime for
indigenous knowledge must be well taken, the emergence in WIPO of a new
alliance of developed, developing, and indigenous groups committed to an
ecologically-oriented intellectual property order that also supports indigenous
innovation should not be underestimated. This uncommon partnership at the
multilateral level simulates the virtues of partnerships between indigenous
peoples and scientists described in Chapter 11, in which a key requirement is to
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overcome the “trust gap” between indigenous peoples and the state (pp. 202-221).
As this Chapter suggests, the capacity to overcome this trust gap will lie partly in
the development of indigenous developmental networks that function both
offensively and defensively in the strategic management and oversight of
indigenous people’s knowledge. At a minimum, such networks can serve as trust
arbiters assessing when particular forms of intellectual property and other
property arrangements operate in the best interest of indigenous groups.
Professor Drahos’ book is a remarkably powerful analysis of the failed promises
of formal law to advance the interests of all people, particularly those whose
knowledge assets remain so crucial for their and our collective well-being. In the
dreaming tradition of some of the indigenous peoples that are the focus of this
rich analysis of the knowledge ecology of competing worldviews, he has written a
book to be “read, kept, and remembered.”
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